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PER CURIAM 
Robert R. Verbanik, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting defendants’ motion to dismiss.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate and 
remand to the District Court for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
 Verbanik, a prisoner previously housed at the State Correctional Institution in 
Mercer, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint in April 2009, alleging numerous claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Verbanik also filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the 
District Court denied.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Verbanik’s complaint.  In 
response, Verbanik filed an amended complaint.  He subsequently filed two motions for 
appointment of counsel, which the District Court denied.  After the defendants moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint, Verbanik filed a second amended complaint, and the 
defendants again filed a motion to dismiss.  The District Court granted that motion, 
determining that Verbanik had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies 
regarding many of his claims and that he had failed to state a claim as to the remaining 
claims.  Verbanik has appealed and requested appointment of counsel.  
II. Discussion 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District 
Court's order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary.  Gelman 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).  To survive a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 
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v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
556 (2007)).    
 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust all available 
administrative remedies prior to filing suit.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 
297 F.3d 201, 209 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002).  Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and 
we “determin[e] whether a prisoner properly exhausted a claim  . . . by evaluating 
compliance with the prison's specific grievance procedures.”  Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 
F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2010).  Verbanik attempted to exhaust claims that did not pertain 
to misconduct charges under the Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, Policy 
Statement DC-ADM 804 (grievance claims), and he argued that he had exhausted claims 
that pertained to misconduct charges through misconduct proceedings pursuant to Inmate 
Disciplinary and Restricted Housing Procedures, Policy Statement DC-ADM 801 
(misconduct claims).  We address these sets of claims separately. 
A. Grievance Claims 
In support of their motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, defendants 
attached an affidavit from Dorina Varner, an administrative officer in the Department of 
Corrections’ Grievance Review Office, which stated that Verbanik had not sought final 
review of any grievance.  The District Court dismissed Verbanik’s grievance claims 
because he did not seek final administrative review of those claims under the Inmate 
Grievance Review System.   
Verbanik concedes that he did not present his grievance claims through the 
entirety of established prison grievance process, but he argues that administrative 
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remedies were not available because defendants retaliated against him for filing 
grievances, and he feared further retaliation from defendants if he proceeded with the 
grievance process.  Although we have held that administrative remedies may be 
unavailable when prison officials have thwarted an inmate’s attempt to exhaust by 
providing erroneous instructions about the grievance process, see Brown v. Croak, 312 
F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2002), we have not addressed the specific question presented 
here:  whether threats of retaliation can render administrative remedies unavailable.  
Other courts of appeals have concluded that retaliation or threats of retaliation against an 
inmate for pursuing a grievance may make administrative remedies unavailable to the 
inmate.  See Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2008); Kaba v. Stepp, 
458 F.3d 678, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2006); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686-87 (2d 
Cir. 2004).  The test for determining whether administrative remedies were available, set 
forth in Hemphill, is whether a “similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness” would 
have deemed the grievance procedures to be available.  380 F.3d at 688. 
In his second amended complaint, Verbanik claimed that he could not exhaust 
administrative remedies because defendants retaliated against him after he filed 
grievances by harassing him, writing falsified misconduct reports, and, on at least one 
occasion, leaving him in the Restricted Housing Unit shower for almost two hours.  The 
District Court noted Verbanik’s argument but rejected it as “bald unsupported statements 
that he was unable to pursue his claims out of fear of retaliation.”  Opinion at 6.  This 
cursory consideration of Verbanik’s argument is troubling for two reasons.  It does not 
appear to acknowledge that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq., 
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requires that an inmate exhaust only those administrative remedies “as are available.”  42. 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).  Moreover, the 
District Court rejected Verbanik’s arguments as unsupported after failing to provide him 
a meaningful opportunity to respond to defendants’ affidavit.   
  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to “Plaintiff’s 
unexhausted claims” on the basis of an affidavit submitted in support of their motion.  
Opinion at 6-7.  However, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if, on a motion to 
dismiss, “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and all parties 
“must be given reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the 
motion.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).  Although the defendants asserted that the District Court 
properly could consider the affidavit and other attachments in connection with their 
motion to dismiss, they also requested that the court “accept these documents and convert 
their motion into a motion for summary judgment.”  Brief in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 7 & n.3.  The District Court 
did not convert their motion to a motion for summary judgment and did not otherwise 
provide Verbanik an opportunity to present all material pertinent to the question of 
exhaustion.  See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1989).  Given these 
circumstances and what appear to be genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of 
retaliation, we cannot treat the District Court’s order as one granting summary judgment 
to defendants and then affirm its conclusion that, as a matter of law, Verbanik failed to 
exhaust all available administrative remedies.  See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 
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572, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Brown, 312 F.3d at 112.   
 B. Misconduct Claims 
The District Court separately addressed whether Verbanik had exhausted 
administrative remedies through the inmate disciplinary system as to his claims that 
pertained to misconduct proceedings.  The District Court concluded that Verbanik failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies regarding claims that did not allege due process 
violations and that he failed to state a due process violation because, in light of Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), he did not demonstrate “that he had a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest that was offended by the Defendants’ actions in allegedly 
issuing a false report.”  Opinion at 10-11. The District Court did not set forth Verbanik’s 
claims or clarify which of those claims allege due process violations.  Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult for us “to exercise our appellate function to determine 
whether the district court committed an error of law” as to either basis for its dismissal of 
these claims.  See Logan v. Moyer, 898 F.2d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 1990).   
We have not yet decided whether or under what circumstances a prisoner may 
exhaust administrative remedies in the course of misconduct proceedings under DC-
ADM 801.  See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
Inmate Discipline Policy is distinct from the Inmate Grievance Review System and 
declining to hold that a Pennsylvania inmate may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in 
misconduct proceedings).  We decline to do so on this record.   
It appears that the District Court dismissed all “non-due-process” claims for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies because such claims could not have been 
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raised in the prison disciplinary system.  To the extent that Verbanik was required to 
exhaust through the Inmate Grievance Review System (DC-ADM 804) any claim that 
could not have been addressed in the Inmate Discipline System (DC-ADM 801), the 
District Court erred in failing to consider his argument that remedies were not available 
because he feared retaliation by defendants.
1
   
As the District Court erred in considering matters outside the pleadings without 
advising the parties that the defendants’ motion would be treated as a summary judgment 
motion and providing Verbanik an opportunity to present his own affidavit in response, 
and as there is a question whether administrative remedies were rendered unavailable as 
to all of Verbanik’s claims by defendants’ alleged retaliatory actions, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order and will remand for further proceedings.  We deny Verbanik’s 
motion for appointment of counsel.  In light of the complexity of the exhaustion issues, 
however, the District Court may wish to appoint counsel upon remand.        
                                                 
1
 In many (if not all) of his misconduct claims, Verbanik asserts that charges were 
filed in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutionally protected right.  “[G]overnment 
actions, which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be 
constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for 
exercise of a constitutional right.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000).  Any such claim 
would not be foreclosed under Sandin.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223-24 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
